Innovation contracts with leakage through licensing by Evans, SB
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 2010-11 
 
 
 
 
Innovation Contracts with Leakage Through Licensing 
 
 
 
 
Shane B. Evans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ISSN 1443-8593 
ISBN 978-1-86295-600-1 
Innovation Contracts with Leakage Through Licensing
Shane B. Evans∗
October 5, 2010
Abstract
In this paper a Developer contracts with a Researcher for the production of a non-
drastic innovation. Since effort is non-contractible, the Developer offers an incentive
contract dependent on the observed magnitude of the innovation. It is shown that
the distribution of intellectual property rights (IPR) ownership does not affect the
level of effort exerted for innovations where the Developer would choose to license
the innovation to its competitors. This is because the possibility of leakage of the
innovation through licensing subsidies the Developer’s payment when IPR is delegated
to the Researcher, while at the same time eroding its profit.
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1 Introduction
Innovation and technology are matters of ongoing importance in developed countries. There
has been a great deal of research on incentives to undertake research and development,
protection of the resultant intellectual property rights (IPR) by patenting or trade secrets,
and licensing or knowledge sharing of innovations.1 However, there has recently been greater
focus on the way that innovators are compensated, since there is an increasing reliance of
R&D intensive industries on outside research.2 Issues of bargaining strength, ownership of
IPR and the propensity for innovators to leak knowledge to parties outside a contract are at
the focus of recent work. This paper contributes by examining the impact of the ownership
of the IPR to an innovation on the incentive contract between developers and researchers.
Innovation creates knowledge, which has the peculiar nature of being durable, non-
rivalrous in consumption and partially excludable. Durability means that once a party
obtains knowledge, it does not wear out or depreciate making it difficult to commit to not
using wherever it has value. Non-rivalrous in consumption means that different parties may
use the knowledge simultaneously. Partial excludability implies that appropriation of the
benefits of an innovation is problematic since the strength of property rights may vary con-
siderably. These properties ensure that IPR plays a central role in the contracts written
between a developer and researcher, since innovation knowledge can be leaked to parties
outside of the contract.
An innovation contract in this paper involves a compensation wage, and an assignment of
ownership of the IPR that results. Despite the capital intensity of most research programs,
wages paid to researchers represent the largest component of R&D expenditures, averaging
around 50% of total R&D expenditures in OECD countries (Public Support for Science
and Innovation, PC Research Report 2007, pg. 588). Moreover, there is ample evidence of
incentive contracting between large research intensive firms and innovators.3 However, there
1See for example, Scotchmer (2004), Anton and Yao (2002, 2004), Gallini and Wright (1990), Kamien
and Tauman (1986) and Wang (1998).
2See for example Lai, Riezman and Wang (2009), Veraevel and Vencatachellum (2009) and Martimort,
Poudou and Sand-Zantman (2010).
3Lerner and Wulf (2006) empirically investigate the link between compensation of research personnel to
the objectives of large US corporations.
is little theoretical attention on the wage contracting arrangements in innovation markets.
The second part of an innovation contract, ownership, is crucial because it bestows the right
to license new technologies, an important source of revenue for the holders of the IPR. One
estimate of the market for innovation licensing in the software industry puts the figure at
$US100 billion in 2003 (see Bhattacharya et al (2006)).
For a developer, the process of obtaining innovation knowledge is plagued by at least two
agency problems. The first is a moral hazard problem of unobservable and non-verifiable
effort. The second is a leakage problem that results because innovation knowledge is durable,
partially excludable and non-rivalrous. In this paper, the first agency problem is tackled with
the usual incentive contract approach. The second agency problem is avoided by assuming
perfectly enforceable property rights, and that ownership rights can be assigned in a contract
before the innovation is created.4
The model consists of a Development Unit (DU, for example, a pharmaceutical company,
or a Silicon Valley firm) who enters into a contract with a Research Unit (RU, for example,
a biotechnology laboratory, or a software designer) for the creation of an innovation. The
DU is assumed not to have expertise in the RU’s field, or the ongoing need for its skills to
justify integration as an ownership configuration. Alternatively, the RU owns a bundle of
complementary skills or assets that warrant a vertically separated structure.5
While each party may hold IPR for existing innovations, at the time of contracting the
exact specification of the innovation to be created in the contract is unknown. As such, the
RU has no bargaining power, since there are many RUs that could perform the research task.
Moreover, the DU provides the framework for the innovation to be generated in: without
this framework, the RU could not independently create the innovation. The question of this
paper is then: under what conditions would the DU prefer to retain control over the IPR
and residual control rights to licensing?
One reason for asking this question is concerned with the power of the incentive contract
that the DU can offer. Since it retains all the bargaining power, any trade gains can be
4The alternative would be to model the imperfect protection that patents infer as in Lemley and Shapiro
(2005), who examine the implication of uncertain property rights under patenting, or “probabilistic patents”.
5See the incomplete contracting literature: Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988).
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transferred to it through ex post lump sums. However, more total producer surplus could be
generated if the RU is given high powered incentives to work. Such incentives could come
through entitlement to the stream of revenue from licensing the innovation to other DUs in
the industry.
It is the uncertain nature of R&D and the inability of the DU to observe and verify the
RU’s action, or research effort, that necessitates the use of incentive contracting. In this
respect, the model is not different from many other Principal-Agent relationships. Usually
the interaction between the principal and the agent results in surplus that can be divided in
some way between the two, according to a predetermined rule or contract. For example, in
Holmstrom’s (1979) example of a machine repairman whose unobservable action influences
the expected time before the machine breaks down, the surplus generated is the expected
net value of the production when the machine is put in use. The demand for the repairman’s
services is a derived demand extending from the principal alone. Unlike Holmstrom’s example
however, the agent’s effort in this model confers two benefits: an internal and an external
demand for the RU’s services. The internal demand stems from a direct payoff to the
Principal from utilising the resulting innovation. This is analogous to the result of the efforts
of the repairman. Note that the incentives for the repairman depend only on the explicit
incentives he faces as controlled by the Principal. Where the present model departs from
the standard framework is in the incorporation of a second source of benefit from the RU’s
services: an external demand for the RU’s innovation efforts from the DU’s competitors.
This provides an implicit incentive that is out of the control of the DU. Now the RU’s efforts
produce a new technology that has value not just to the DU, but also other actors in the
DU’s output market. So to completely describe the contracting environment, the assignment
of the residual control rights, or the ownership of the IPR, will need to be considered. If
the DU delegates IPR to the RU, then the RU faces both an explicit incentive through the
incentive contract from the DU, and an implicit incentive through the private return it can
receive through licensing of the new technology to consumers other than the DU.
Hence, for the DU, retaining control of the IPR may be inefficient in terms of eliciting
effort from the RU. On the other hand, turning control of the IPR over to the RU results in
innovations that could be licensed to its own competitor’s, thus reducing its profitability in
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the output market. The results of this paper show that firstly, whenever an innovation would
be profitable for the DU itself to license, ownership of the IPR is irrelevant. The reduction
in the DU’s expected profit from assigning IPR to the RU is offset by an exact reduction
in its expected payment to the RU. Second, whenever the marginal licensing revenue of
the innovation is greater than the reduction in the value of the innovation to the DU from
allocating IPR to the RU, the DU prefers to retain the IPR for the innovation; in which case
it will choose not to license.
The next section of the paper briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 sets up the
incentive contracting model and derives the optimal wage contract. Section 4 presents the
main ownership equivalence result when the DU would leak the innovation through licensing
itself, and section 5 demonstrates the conditions under which ownership matters. Section 6
provides an example of the results in the context of a product differentiation model, and the
last section concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Much of the vast literature on innovation contracting and management is dedicated to as-
sessing the impact of the legal strength and ownership of IPR on incentives under different
informational environments. Broadly speaking, the innovation literature that deals with in-
centive theoretic issues can be divided into two streams: one where the informed party takes
the initiative, and one where the uninformed party takes the initiative.6
The informed party takes the initiative in the signalling models of Bhattacharya and
Ritter (1983), Gallini and Wright (1990), Anton and Yao (2002, 2004) and its extension
Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006). The form that the signal can take differs among these pa-
pers. For example, the innovator’s decision to publicly disclose knowledge through patenting
in Bhattacharya and Ritter signals the economic value of the innovation to an external fi-
nancier, while at the same time eroding its advantage over its competitors through leakage
and imitation. In fact, the decision to disclose knowledge through a formal patent system
or rely on common law and trade secrets depends on the legal IPR strength that patenting
6Such a distinction is used by Salanie (2005) to classify families of contract theory models (pg. 4).
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confers to the innovator. This was studied in Anton and Yao (2002, 2004) and Bhattacharya
and Guriev (2006). In Gallini and Wright, the structure of the licensing contract under asym-
metric information serves as a signal of the licensor’s pre-contractual information about the
value of the innovation, a feature that is also examined in Martimort, Poudou and Sand-
Zantman (2010). It is the possibility of imitation, or the strength of IPR that generate the
results in all these papers.
The uninformed party takes the initiative through use of incentive contracts in the models
of Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington (1992), Veraevel and Vencatachellum (2009), Lai,
Riezman and Wang (2009) and Martimort, Poudou and Sand-Zantman (2010). The latter of
these papers is a model of double sided asymmetric information. On one side, the innovator
has private knowledge of the value of its innovation which it attempts to signal through
contract form to a developer who must be incentivised to exert efficient effort by the same
contract.7 The optimal mode of licensing is studied in Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington,
where entry fees into a research joint venture with simultaneous innovators can influence the
degree of information sharing and effort levels. In their model, the innovators first produce
an innovation, then compete with each other in a final output market. This is similar
to Veraevel and Ventachellum’s model where duopolists competing in an output market
simultaneously innovate, however in their model the innovation is outsourced to a common
R&D laboratory, which is compared to the benchmark of in-house innovation. In both cases,
the degree to which the informed party can benefit from spill-overs determines to some
extent the organisational form of the industry. In contrast, this paper starts out assuming
that innovation is delegated to a researcher, and evaluates how assignment of IPR is relevant
to the contract. The study that bears the most similarity to this endeavour is that of Lai,
Riezman and Wang’s (2009) model of innovation outsourcing.
At the heart of Lai et al (2009) lies the agency problem of leakage, where the researcher
cannot commit (in general) to not exploit their knowledge. However, leakage does not emerge
as an agency problem in this paper. Rather, the problem is analysed here as the external
source of benefit in the contracting environment, and access to this external demand is
7Hence, Martimort, Poudou and Sand-Zantman (2010) really have both informed and uniformed parties
taking initiative.
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through leaking the innovation through the legitimate means of licensing. Like Lai et al
(2009), this paper uses an incentive theory approach where the developer has all the bar-
gaining power. They ask whether a developer wishing to develop a cost-reducing innovation
should organise their innovation activities using an in-house research team, or outsource to
an independent research team. So the ownership of the IPR is implicitly a choice variable
in their problem. In essence, they investigate a make-or-buy decision for R&D contracts.
In contrast, the present analysis takes as given a vertical industry structure - there is no
question of innovating in-house.
Unverifiable leakage of knowledge leads to Lai et al (2009)’s central trade-off: the cost of
outsourcing R&D, or the erosion of the developer’s profit through leakage of the innovation
knowledge, is weighed against the increase in efficiency of innovation from employing a
specialist researcher. As a result, Lai et al (2009) find that the optimal incentives take the
form of a revenue sharing contract. This arises because it is a mechanism that aligns the
researcher’s incentives with the developer’s: the researcher is less likely to leak the innovation
knowledge if it has a claim to a share of the developer’s profit if leakage is harmful to the
developer. If the balance of the effects falls in favour of the efficiency of the researcher,
then outsourcing is the equilibrium outcome. Otherwise, the researcher prefers an in-house
arrangement.
Unlike Lai et al (2009), this paper begins by assuming that the developer is in the busi-
ness of licensing its new technology to competitors. Hence, the literature exemplified by
Wang (1998) on insider patentees comes to bear on the investigation. Whenever it is op-
timal to license the innovation, the developer would choose to do it. IPRs are therefore
formalised in this paper and play a fundamental role in determining who benefits directly
from licensing, and the magnitude and determinants of the optimal incentive contract. Both
the results of this paper and Lai et al (2009) imply a dependency of the optimal marginal
incentive coefficient on the total revenue generated by the innovation. Hence, the incentives
theory framework of both papers shed light on the determinants of the optimal incentive
contract and the most efficient IPR ownership arrangement. The papers are however lim-
ited in situations where the researcher has some bargaining power and there is contractual
incompleteness. Aghion and Tirole (1994) employ an incomplete contracting approach to
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deal with that case.
In this paper, the impact of IPR ownership with leakage is investigated in a model with
linear incentive contracts. Specifically, the Linear-Exponential-Normal framework of Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987), (1991), as augmented by Laffont and Martimort (2002), is used
here to outline a Principal-Agent problem. Their models feature a linear compensation wage
that the Principal (developer) offers to the Agent (researcher). Moreover, the functional form
of the researcher’s utility is assumed to exhibit Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (C.A.R.A),
with r defined to be the Arrow-Pratt absolute measure of risk aversion. Finally, the developer
receives a noisy signal about the researcher’s effort level, e, rendering effort a non-contractible
variable. The noise is additive and assumed normally distributed. This framework requires
a linearisation of the researcher’s payoff in order to obtain explicit solutions for the contract.
3 Analytical Framework
This section employs a Principal-Agent model to establish a framework for analysing the
delegation of the IPR. The framework allows for a comparison of the structure of the incentive
contract that the DU offers the RU under the different ownership arrangements. First, the
model is set up carefully to include the internal and external benefits from the creation of
an innovation. Then individual rational and incentive compatible constraints are formalised
taking into account the two sources of benefit. Finally, the optimal incentive contract is
derived, and its properties evaluated in the conclusion to the section.
The risk neutral principal, or Development Unit (DU) and risk averse agent, or Research
Unit (RU) enter a contractual arrangement to produce an innovation of magnitude indexed
by θ ∈ R. The units of the measure of the index depend on the context of the innovation. For
instance, for technological innovations, θ may measure the reduction in marginal cost when
using the innovation. For product quality-improving innovations, θ may be a parameter in
the consumers’ utility function.
The innovation may be valuable to both DU and its competitors, the latter to whom it
can be sold, or patented and licensed by the holder of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
of the innovation. The parameter τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 reflects the degree to which the innovation
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can be passed on to the DU’s competitors. Equivalently, τ is a measure of the specificity
of the innovation to the DU. If the nature of the innovation that is contracted for is firm-
specific, then τ = 0, and clearly none of the DU’s competitors would purchase a license to
use it. On the other hand, if the innovation is of a very general nature or common to the
technology that each of DU’s competitors have installed, then τ = 1 and the innovation is
valuable to the DU’s competitors. For all other values of τ , only part of the full innovation
that the DU can use can be implemented by its competitors.8
Innovation IPR is a valuable by-product of the RU-DU relationship. The IPR can be used
to generate revenue in two ways: directly as a result of the DU’s increased competitiveness
in the output market, and indirectly through extracting rents created from competing firms
using the innovation to produce in the output market. IPR, being a knowledge good, is
durable. Hence, the RU team members who create the innovation retain the knowledge of
the process of inventing the innovation. Hence, while the product of the knowledge can be
legally defined as a property right, it is possible that the information from the IPR can be
transferred both formally and informally through the RU’s other activities.
To be explicit, even in the case that the RU does not retain the IPR from its relationship
with the DU, it may use its experience to develop an innovation for one of the DU’s down-
stream competitors at a small cost. Alternatively, the RU may overtly re-sell the innovation
to the DU’s competitors, whether it infringes on a patent, or imitates the technology in a
way that does not infringe on IPR. In light of this, it is reasonably assumed that the only way
the DU can protect its IPR, or appropriate the rents from its licensing, is if it incurs a cost
of identifying infringements and enforcing the IPR. Moreover, the RU’s expertise allows it to
engage in the same activities for a negligible cost. Because of this, the RU can never credibly
commit to not leaking the IPR to the downstream competitors, unless the DU patents and
enforces the IPR of the innovation.
Hence the IPR can be patented at some cost and licensed, or kept as a trade secret
8A justification for use of this device can be found in Lai et al (2009). Their paper identifies adaptability
of the outsourced innovation to the production firms’ environment as a feature of R&D activity. Although
in the context of their paper, adaptability refers to the relative ease with which an informed in-house team
can adapt an innovation compared to an outsourced R&D team. The parameter τ can be thought of as a
measure of relationship-specific investment, although it is taken to be exogenous in the model.
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and leaked through the channels mentioned above. In either case, the revenue from the
transactions over the new technology will be referred to as licensing. License revenue is
denoted l(θ, τ). In order to compute an explicit solution to the incentive problem, it is
necessary to use a first order approximation to the license revenue:
l(θ, τ) ≈ κ(τ)θ, κ(τ) ≥ 0 (3.1)
where κ(τ) is a measure of the aggregate incremental value of a unit of innovation to the DU’s
competitors: the marginal licensing revenue. The marginal license revenue is non-decreasing
in the degree of firm specificity of the innovation, κ′(τ) > 0.
The RU can only produce non-drastic innovations. A drastic innovation is defined as one
where, in maximising its profit, the innovator can drive the other firms out of the market
with its new technology. It follows that a non-drastic innovation does not result in all firms
being driven from the market. While it is not essential to the results presented here, it will
be assumed that no firm is driven from the market as a result of adoption by one or many
competitors of an innovation technology.
It is conceivable that large innovations should emerge in different industry structures
than the one considered here. For example, RUs can be contracted by a DU after already
developing an innovation, or having some R&D at interim stages of development. In those
situations, typically a bargaining framework is used, and the mechanics of incomplete con-
tract theory are relied on to determine optimal ownership arrangements. While ruling out
drastic-innovations may reduce the scope of this analysis, it is in accord with the other as-
sumptions of the model. In particular, the modeling framework requires a degree of linearity
that is best implemented by considering only small deviations from the initial optimum.
The RU has a linear innovation technology, where every unit of effort that it exerts, e,
translates into a unit of innovation, up to the realisation of a random outcome:
θ = e+ ε (3.2)
where ε is a random variable normally distributed with mean zero, ε ∼ N(0, σ2). As a result
of the random variable in the innovation technology, the realised size of the innovation is
only a noisy signal of the agent’s effort level. Hence, effort is unobservable and non-verifiable
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by a third party so that no contracts can be written directly on the RU’s effort. However,
since effort controls the mean of the innovation technology, contracts can be written on the
innovation signal θ, which is positively correlated with effort.
The terms of the contract specify a money payment to the RU contingent on the size of
the innovation. The compensation is linear in the innovation: w(θ) = αθ+β, where α is the
strength of the marginal effort incentives provided by the DU, and β is a fixed income to
insure the RU against the uncertainty in the innovation technology. The strength of the α
coefficient, which is the DU’s control variable, determines the power of the incentive provided
for the RU’s task. The total money cost of producing an innovation is C(e), which is assumed
strictly increasing and convex in effort level. It is also assumed that C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0 and
lime→∞C(e) = +∞.9 The expected value of the RU’s payoff is then w(θ˜) + λl(θ˜, τ)− C(e),
with the expectation taken over ε. The binary variable λ indicates ownership of the IPR of
the innovation. If the RU owns the IPR then λ = 1, otherwise the DU owns the IPR and
λ = 0.
The DU’s ex post payoff from R&D is denoted as V (θ, τ). The benefit to the DU consists
of the incremental direct profit, ∆pˆi(θ, τ), that it makes from selling in the output market
with its new innovation-augmented technology, and the license revenue if it is the owner of
the IPR. Regardless of who licenses the innovation, if the innovation is of value to the DU’s
competitors then it is assumed to erode the direct profit of the DU. Later on, to obtain an
explicit solution for the incentive coefficients, the first order approximation for the DU’s ex
post benefit from producing with the innovation is employed: ∆pˆi(θ, τ) = ∆pi(τ)θ for any
τ ∈ [0, 1]. The risk neutral DU’s expected profit becomes:
Eε˜V (θ, τ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(∆pˆi(e+ ε, τ) + (1− λ)l(e+ ε, τ)− w(e+ ε))dF (ε) (3.3)
The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure (1) and summarised as follows: at date 0,
the DU offers the RU a linear compensation wage, w(θ) and specifies the ownership mode
of any IPR that is created; at date 1, the RU accepts or rejects the offer; at date 2, the RU
exerts an effort e to produce an innovation according to its innovation technology; at date
3 the innovation outcome θ is realised; at date 4 the owner of the IPR chooses whether to
9These conditions ensure a positive finite amount of effort is exerted at the optimum.
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license the innovation; at date 5 all output market transfers and production decisions are
made, and the contract is executed. To operationalise the model, some specific functional
Time
? ? ? ? ? ?
-
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
DU offers
contract
{w(θ), λ}
RU accepts
or refuses
RU exerts
effort
Outcome
θ
is realised
IPR
licensing
decision made
Transfers
are executed
Figure 1: Timing
forms are introduced. First, a quadratic form is used for the RU’s effort cost: C(e) = 1
2
e2.
Note that C(e) satisfies all the restrictions mentioned above. The RU’s attitude to risk is
characterised by C.A.R.A. When it accepts the DU’s incentive contract, it is exposed to
uncertain variation in its wage due to the innovation shock. Hence, it is possible to define
the certain amount of wealth, wCE, that makes the RU indifferent to taking, or accepting
the gamble of the DU’s incentive contract; ie. its certainty equivalent:
u(wCE) = E ε˜u(w(θ)− C(e) + λl(θ, τ)) (3.4)
where the agent’s utility function u(.) defined over wealth, w, is C.A.R.A, with u(w) =
−e−rw, where r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Note that the agent’s
effort cost is defined in money terms, and so this is a case of non-separable utility (see Laffont
and Martimort (2002), Ch. 5.2.3).
In order to induce the RU to accept the contract, the DU must offer it a level of expected
utility equivalent to its reservation utility, or its opportunity cost. This is equivalent to
guaranteeing the corresponding certainty-equivalent.
Lemma 1 (Individual Rationality) Given the RU’s utility function is C.A.R.A and defined
over wealth, w, the RU’s certainty equivalent defined in units of wealth is:
wCE = β + (α + λκ(τ))e− 12e2 − r2(α + λκ(τ))2σ2 (3.5)
Individual rationality requires wCE ≥ w¯, where w¯ is the RU’s outside opportunity.
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The individual rationality constraint alone does not provide incentives for the RU to exert
effort. Since effort is unobservable to the DU and costly for the RU, the RU selects it in
a way that optimises its utility from the R&D activity. This involves a balancing of the
sources of revenue from the innovation and the personal effort cost incurred by the RU,
while mitigating the risk inherent in the innovation technology. To this end, the RU will
select a level of effort on its task to maximise the certainty equivalent payoff in equation
(3.5). The RU’s problem is:
e(λ) ∈ arg max
e∗≥0
{
β + (α + λκ(τ))e∗ − 1
2
e2∗ − r
2
(α + λκ(τ))2σ2
}
(3.6)
The solution to the RU’s problem gives the incentive compatibility constraint for the DU.
The DU anticipates the behaviour of the RU in choosing its level of effort, and should select
the power of its incentive payment accordingly. Recognition of this leads to the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2 (Incentive Compatibility) In implementing the incentive feasible linear wage sched-
ule, the DU is bound by the following constraint: α(λ) + λκ(τ) = e(λ), λ = 1, 0.
The intuition for the incentive constraint is straightforward: the RU selects a level of effort
where its marginal benefit in units of wealth is equal to the marginal cost of exerting effort, e,
measured in units of wealth. When the RU retains the IPR of the innovation, it is rewarded
at the margin for the last unit of effort exerted partly through the reward scheme, α, and
partly through its private return from license revenues, κ(τ).
The DU’s problem can be written as:
max
{α,β,e}
[Eε˜(∆pi(τ)θ + (1− λ)l(θ, τ))− w(θ)] , s.t Lemmata (1) and (2) (3.7)
In the Principal-Agent relationship, the DU has all the bargaining power which means the
IR constraint will always bind. If the DU leaves the RU with any wealth over its certainty
equivalent from entering the relationship, then the RU’s expected utility is higher than the
utility of its certainty equivalent. Then it would always be possible for the DU to reduce its
payment to w(θ) − , for an  > 0 and still induce the RU to sign the contract. Using the
fact that the IR and IC are binding at the optimum solution for effort profiles, the problem
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can be rewritten as a maximisation of the choice of incentive coefficient α only. First, using
the IC condition in Lemma (2) to eliminate effort choices from the certainty-equivalent wage
in Lemma (1) yields:
wCE = β +
1
2
(α + λκ(τ))2(1− rσ2) ≥ w¯
Since this equation binds at the reservation certainty-equivalent level w¯, an expression of
the fixed income component of the linear compensation wage, β, can be recovered. Now
replacing the new expression for the certainty equivalent wage in program (3.7) yields:
max
{α}
[
Eε˜(∆pi(τ)(α + λκ(τ)) + (1− λ)l(θ, τ))− w¯ + 12(α + λκ(τ))2(1− rσ2)− α(α + λκ(τ))
]
(3.8)
The DU’s program in (3.8) is concave. The unique solution gives the optimal incentive
coefficient α∗(λ), from which the general linear compensation wage can be constructed:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Linear Compensation Wage) The unique solution to the DU’s pro-
gram in (3.8) yields a linear incentive compensation wage given by: {α∗(λ), β∗}, where:
α∗(λ) := max
{
∆pi(τ)+(1−λ)κ(τ)−λκ(τ)rσ2
1 + rσ2
, 0
}
& β∗ := w¯ + (rσ
2−1)
2
(
∆pi(τ) + κ(τ)
1 + rσ2
)2
where λ = 1 for RU IPR ownership, and λ = 0 for DU IPR ownership.
The optimal incentive coefficient α∗(λ) depends on both the internal and external demands
for the innovation, and the risk aversion parameters of the RU’s utility. As usual, when
the risk aversion parameter r and the variance of the innovation shock, σ2 are large, the
DU optimally shades the strength of the marginal incentive coefficient. This is to shield the
risk averse RU from the full uncertainty in the innovation production, while still forcing the
RU to bear some of the risk so as to align their incentives with those of the DU. The risk
aversion parameters can be assumed to take values such that rσ2 > 1, without impacting on
the results. Then an increase in r or σ2 also raises the fixed component of the wage, β. This
is the standard insurance versus incentives trade-off in the moral hazard literature.
The magnitude of the marginal incentive coefficient, α∗(λ), reflects the value to the DU
from the RU’s effort. If the IPR is retained by the DU, then it appropriates the internal
value ∆pi(τ) as well as the external value κ(τ) from leaking the IPR through licensing. As
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such, to optimally align the explicit incentives of the RU with the DU, α incorporates the
full value of both these sources of benefit, ∆pi(τ) + κ(τ), appropriately shaded for risk by
1 + rσ2: α∗(0) = ∆pi(τ)+κ(τ)
1+rσ2
. In contrast, when the IPR of the innovation is delegated to the
RU, the DU only appropriates the internal benefit from its direct profit ∆pi(τ). Hence, the
DU only explicitly incentivises the RU’s effort for that value, and not for the license revenue.
Moreover, since the RU now faces an implicit incentive through leaking the innovation to the
external market, the DU can lower the marginal incentive coefficient: α∗(1) = ∆pi(τ)−rσ
2κ(τ)
1+rσ2
.
So under IPR delegation, the RU bears the risk for the effort to satisfy the internal demand
for its services, for which it is partially insured and rewarded explicitly by the DU. It is also
bears some risk itself for the effort that it exerts to satisfy the external demand, for which it
is not insured, but is rewarded implicitly through the marginal licensing revenue it receives.
Proposition (1) also reports that the optimal marginal incentive coefficient cannot be
negative. A negative marginal incentive implies that the RU would have to provide payments
to the DU for provision of its own efforts.10 To this end, incentive contracting is defined as
feasible only if α(λ) > 0 under the relevant ownership mode. Later in this paper the key
results are studied in a product differentiation model. In that setting, feasibility of incentive
contracting yields an IPR ownership result where only innovations whose value to the DU’s
competitors are small enough will be delegated.
In summary, it can be seen that the IPR delegation decision will affect the optimal
incentive contract that the DU can offer the RU. Leakage through licensing is explicitly
rewarded if the IPR belongs to the DU. Under delegation, leakage through licensing is not
explicitly rewarded, but rather subsidises the DU’s marginal wage bill. The next section
draws out the implications of this subsidy on the total effort level of the RU, the wage bill
for the DU under both ownership arrangements, and the impact in the DU’s expected profit.
4 Weak Equivalence of Ownership
This section presents the main result of the paper using the optimal incentive contract
derived in Proposition (1) in the previous section. Whenever it would be profitable for the
10Note that payments from the RU to the DU are ruled out by assuming that the RU is cash-constrained.
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DU to license an innovation to its own competitors, an incentive contract to obtain such an
innovation results in an invariance of the DU’s expected payoff to delegation of IPR. This
result is underpinned by three key assumptions: first, that the RU has superior information
regarding the innovation technology. Second, the DU has all the bargaining power in the
contract. Third, the DU is neutral to the risk in the creation of the innovation, whereas the
RU is risk averse. Under these conditions, an IPR ownership invariance results.
The first key assumption gives rise to the agency problem. If the DU has perfect and
complete information, then it would have no problem in implementing the first-best level
of effort from an in-house research team with a simple discrete contract. In practice, R&D
divisions use a large number of performance measures to monitor their workers’ efforts.
The literature on performance measures and R&D projects, (for example, see Bergmann
and Friedl (2008)), identifies a number of non-financial performance measures for R&D
managers. These include functionality points (particularly relevant for software companies),
achievement of milestones, and achievement of efficiency and quality standards. This non-
exhaustive list includes measures that can be directed at individual, team or workplace
levels. Moreover, there is empirical support for the link between the use of such measures
and successful innovation as documented in Kressens-van Drongelen and Bilderbeek (1999).
The use of these performance measures in innovative activities is evidence that an agency
problem exists.
The strong bargaining power assumption can be qualified by focusing attention on small
innovations, like process innovations to reduce the marginal cost of a developed product,
or quality innovations that capture small increments in market share. In these cases it is
reasonable to assume that there are many RUs that are equally capable of undertaking
the R&D, and so competition prevents them from earning rents. Notwithstanding, the
bargaining power assumption is pertinent to the results that follow. Allowing the RU to
have the ability to bargain, or making bargaining power endogenous to the contract is left
for future research.
The validity of the assumptions on attitudes to risk can be justified on grounds of scale:
typically, DUs are much larger entities than RUs, and have a correspondingly larger and
more diverse asset base. As the innovations provided for in the contract are small relative to
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the size of the DU, they comprise only a small part of the risk profile of the DU, whereas, the
RU is considered as a specialist in the area it is contracted for and is therefore not diversified.
Even if the RU firm itself is diversified in an array of other projects, the research manager
is assumed to care about the success of the innovation, not just its expected value.
These three key assumptions permit a closer examination of the determinants of IPR
ownership on R&D incentives. In agency problems with only an internal benefit of the type
described above, the power of the incentive contract is determined by a balance of provision
of incentive for exertion of effort on one hand, and the need to insure the agent against the
risk inherent in the contracted activity on the other. The same is true in the set up here: as
has been noted, the optimal incentive contract involves a marginal incentive coefficient α(λ)
that rewards the RU’s marginal effort, and a fixed payment β that the RU receives regardless
of the outcome of their activities (from Proposition (1)). However, unlike standard agency
problems, both of these coefficients depend upon the internal and external demand for the
innovation.
The degree to which the internal and external demands affect the marginal incentive
depend on the delegation of IPR decision. Consequently, the magnitude of the optimal
incentive coefficient, and the elicitation of RU effort through Lemma (2) both depend upon
the delegation decision. To see this more clearly, note that ex ante, the DU has two control
variables: it can choose to delegate IPR to the RU, or retain it. Secondly, it selects a level
for the marginal incentive coefficient, or explicit incentives, conditional on the assignment of
IPR.
It follows that if the DU wishes to raise the effort level of the RU, it has two feasible
options. The first is to raise the value of α. Through Lemma (2), the RU optimally raises
its effort in response, since for every dollar that the innovation generates in total to the DU,
the RU receives a greater proportion. The second option is to delegate IPR to the RU. In
doing this, the DU exposes the RU to the implicit incentive channel through the possibility
to license the IPR in the output market. Then the RU receives a share of the profit realised
by the DU in its output market, and all of the licensing revenue it can generate in the output
market. Since it is only capturing the rent from its own profit, the internal benefit, the DU
lowers the level of the marginal incentive coefficient. Inspection of the incentive coefficient in
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Proposition (1) confirms that delegation of IPR ownership results in a lowering of the power
of incentives, since α(1) − α(0) = −κ(τ). This expression points toward the result on the
impact on the overall incentives facing the RU.
IPR delegation results in two competing effects on the overall level of incentives facing
the RU. There is a reduction in the explicit incentive from the marginal incentive coefficient
offered by the DU, by the full amount of the marginal licensing revenue. Simultaneously,
there is an increase in the implicit incentive offered through the private market for the
innovation. What then, is the overall impact on the effort level of the agent? Proposition
(2) provides the answer:
Proposition 2 With a linear incentive compensation wage, the RU’s effort level is identical
regardless of who owns the IPR: e(λ = 1) = e(λ = 0) = e∗.
This Proposition shows that optimal effort level e∗ that the RU exerts is invariant to the IPR
ownership mode. This occurs because the DU has all the bargaining power in the contract
relationship. As a result, the DU can hold the RU to its reservation certainty-equivalent.
Delegation transfers licensing revenue from the DU’s competitors away from the DU to the
RU, but in doing so, accomplishes two things: (i) delegation perfectly crowds out the explicit
marginal effort incentive, and (ii) delegation lowers the DU’s total wage bill since it is paying
less per unit of effort exerted than when it retains the IPR, and the same amount of effort
is exerted. This means that under delegation, the overall incentives facing the RU are still
determined by the internal and external demands. The difference is that the implicit external
demand effect, which is positive under delegation, is completely offset by the reduction in
the DU’s explicit incentives. This intuition for Proposition (2) is the critical result of the
analysis. Using this invariance of effort to IPR ownership, it is straightforward to prove that
the DU’s wage bill is lower under RU IPR. This is demonstrated below in Lemma (3):
Lemma 3 The total wage bill for the DU is larger if it retains the IPR ownership.
The reduction in the total wage bill at first points to the conclusion that the DU prefers to
delegate IPR ownership. However, while the license market subsidises the explicit provision
of incentives to the RU, the DU still both loses the licensing revenue, and is exposed to the
erosion of its profits through the licensing. This means that in deciding whether to delegate
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IPR ownership, the DU must weigh up the reduction in the wage bill against the loss of
total profit. The effort invariance result of Proposition (2) implies that the DU can impute
that the expected size of the innovation is the same under either ownership mode. The
implication of this is gathered in Proposition (3) below. In a situation where the DU would
license if it owned the innovation, the following Proposition provides an equivalence of IPR
ownership.
Proposition 3 (Equivalence) Whenever the DU would license the innovation to its com-
petitors, its expected profit is identical under either ownership mode.
Proposition (3) can be understood by a marginal analysis of the explicit and implicit in-
centives in the problem. An increase in the marginal incentive coefficient by dα raises the
RU’s effort. This has three impacts: (i) the DU’s direct profit increases by ∆pi(τ)dα, (ii)
an increase in the licensing revenue by κ(τ)dα, and (iii) a reduction in the total wage bill
by κ(τ)dα. Delegation of the IPR to the RU results in changes in the magnitudes and
distribution of these marginal effects. To see this more clearly, first note that because the
optimal effort level does not change, the DU’s profit is reduced by exactly the amount of the
licensing revenue under delegation. Since the DU does not accrue the revenue from licensing
under delegation, it reduces the incentives to exert effort by just enough to still induce the
RU to participate in the project. As a result, the total wage bill reduces under delegation
by exactly the same amount as the loss of licensing revenue to the DU. Since the DU is risk
neutral and the expected return under both ownership modes is the same, it is indifferent
to both. The RU receives the reservation utility in both cases. Under DU IPR ownership
the certainty-equivalent is made up by a compensation wage whose marginal incentive coeffi-
cient depends positively on the DU’s direct profit and the licensing revenue. However, under
the delegation, the marginal incentive coefficient depends on the DU’s direct profit, but is
reduced exactly by the marginal licensing revenue. The RU still exerts the same amount of
effort because it has private incentives provided by the return from licensing the innovation
in the output market.
This equivalence result suggests that when the DU wishes to be an insider patentee,
leakage of the innovation is not the critical factor in determining ownership of IPR as in Lai
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et al (2009) and Bhattacharya et al (2006). However, by considering the costs and benefits
of formalising innovation more carefully, a tie-breaking rule may be fruitful in predicting
ownership assignment.
For example, suppose the RU by the nature of their expertise and experience in IP
markets are able to enforce or detect infringement of their IPR at a low cost. Alternatively,
suppose the DU has to incur a non-trivial cost to protect, enforce and detect an infringement
on their IPR which is much greater relative to the RU, since they would have to hire a team
of experts to verify infringement. Then on balance the DU may always prefer to delegate
IPR. Hence, in this framework, it is factors like transaction costs of enforcement rather than
the provision of incentives that would give rise to efficient ownership assignment of IPR.
This is in contrast to the analysis of Lai et al (2009) and Bhattacharya et al (2006).
Issues of transaction costs aside, the hypothesis of Proposition (2) contains a restriction:
for it to apply, the DU would have to want to leak the innovation through licensing on its own
account. Essentially this implies that there is no agency problem with leakage. However, in
the literature on patent licensing, there is usually a threshold innovation size beyond which
the innovator prefers not to license.11 The next section relaxes the requirement that the DU
would wish to license the innovation to establish under what conditions ownership of the
IPR matters to the DU.
5 When IPR Ownership Matters
In the previous section, the DU was indifferent to delegating IPR ownership to the RU and
retaining it. This section discusses the circumstances under which the ownership of the
IPR is going to matter to the DU. The hypothesis of Proposition (2) requires that the DU
would license the innovation itself. In that case, the DU is indifferent to the mode of IPR
ownership. At what point then does the DU prefer to retain IPR?
11See for example Wang (1998) and Hernandez-Murillo and Llobet (2006). Wang (1998) considers a cost-
reducing innovation in a homogeneous output market. In his model, for innovations larger than some critical
value θ∗, the innovator prefers not to license the innovation. For smaller innovations, the innovator licenses.
Hernandez-Murillo and Llobet (2006) consider the case of patent licensing with heterogeneous firms in a
product differentiated market.
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To help answer this question, it is useful to decompose the DU’s marginal profit from
an innovation into the direct impact from operating in the final output market, ∆pi(0),
and the external marginal erosion from having its competitors use the innovation, δ(τ):
∆pi(τ) := ∆pi(0) − δ(τ). Note that τ = 0 in the direct marginal profit since this measures
the marginal value of the innovation to the DU gross of the influence of its competitors.
In contrast, the magnitude of the marginal erosion depends on how valuable the innovation
is to the DU’s competitors, parameterised by τ . Specifically, it is assumed that when the
innovation only has value to the DU there is no erosion: δ(0) = 0. Also, as the innovations
parametrically become less specific to the DU – τ increases – the marginal erosion of the
DU’s profit increases: δ′(τ) > 0.
Using these definitions, Proposition (4) below characterises the condition for DU IPR
ownership. Whenever the marginal erpsion of the DU’s profit is greater than the marginal
extraction of licensing revenue from its competitors, the DU prefers to retain ownership of
the IPR. In this case, it would choose not to license. On the other hand, the RU would
always choose to license: there is a conflict of interest. This conflict is similar in spirit to the
incomplete contracting models, where the action of the agent who controls residual property
rights leads to a reduction in the objective of the other agent.
Proposition 4 (Ownership) Provided the marginal revenue from licensing exceeds the marginal
erosion of the DU’s profit, the DU is indifferent to IPR ownership, otherwise the DU prefers
to retain the IPR and not license the innovation.
The proof of Proposition (4) is straightforward. It involves evaluating the difference in the
expected profit to the DU from delegating IPR ownership to the RU in which case its direct
profit is decreased, and retaining the IPR and not licensing. Substituting the optimised
linear compensation wage into the DU’s expected profit in the situation where it retains IPR
ownership and chooses not to license yields the expression VNL:
VNL =
∆pi(0)2
2(1 + rσ2)
, VRU =
(∆pi(τ) + κ(τ))2
2(1 + rσ2)
Note that no licensing corresponds to the case where τ = 0. The right hand expression VRU
is the DU’s expected profit from delegating IPR whereupon the RU licenses the innovation.
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The difference between these two expected profits yields:
VRU − VNL =
(
(∆pi(τ) + κ(τ)) + ∆pi(0)
2
)(
κ(τ)− δ(τ)
2(1 + rσ2)
)
(5.1)
Since the first factor in the difference in expected profits is the arithmetic average of the total
surplus generated under the two arrangements (which is strictly positive), then the sign of the
difference in expected profits is governed by the second factor, κ(τ)− δ(τ). Thus, whenever
the marginal erosion of the DU’s profit, δ(τ), is larger than the marginal licensing revenue,
κ(τ), the DU prefers to retain IPR ownership and not license the innovation. Otherwise the
equivalence result holds: the DU is indifferent to the ownership arrangement.
The result contrasts somewhat to the Lai, Riezman and Wang (2009), to the extent that
they can be compared. In their paper, a revenue-sharing contract emerges as the optimal
form of contract more often when the RU’s benefit from the external demand by leakage is
a relatively small fraction of the erosion of the DU’s profit from the leakage. So, in their
model, the DU is more inclined to have a vertically separated structure, which effectively
signs IPR over to the RU, only if it can implicitly control the RU’s decision to leak with an
incentive contract. In that situation, the DU trades off the probability of leakage occurring
against the greater efficiency from the incentives offered to the RU. The opposite is true in
Proposition (3). It is only when the erosion in the DU’s profit from leakage through licensing
dominates the benefit to the RU from leakage that the DU prefers to control the IPR, since
in that case it would not wish to license. While it is difficult to make a clear comparison
between the two outcomes, the difference in the results does appear to stem from the fact
that Lai et al (2009) do not allow that the DU might license the innovation to the external
market itself.
It can be seen directly from the condition in Proposition (3) that the degree of firm
specificity of the innovation may impact the DU’s decision to delegate IPR. The reason is
intuitive: innovations which are specific to the DU have low value to the competing firms in
the output market, and erode the DU’s profit by a smaller amount than general innovations.
By imposing some additional structure on κ(τ) and δ(τ), it is possible to be more precise
about the impact of firm specificity of the innovation. It is reasonable to assume that both
the marginal licensing revenue and the erosion of the DU’s profit are non-decreasing in
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innovation specificity. This gives rise to the possibility that on some intervals of the range
of specificity the marginal licensing revenue exceeds the erosion of the DU’s profit, and on
other intervals the reverse is true. This idea is gathered in the Corollary below:
Corollary 1 If κ(τ) and δ(τ) are non-decreasing in τ on [0, 1], then:
(i) if κ(τ)<δ(τ) ∀ τ , then the DU always prefers to retain IPR.
(ii) if κ(τ)>δ(τ) ∀ τ , then the DU is always indifferent to ownership of IPR.
(iii) on any interval [τ ∗0 , τ
∗
1 ] ⊆ [0, 1] where κ(τ ∗) < δ(τ ∗) ∀ τ ∗ ∈ [τ ∗0 , τ ∗1 ] ⊆ [0, 1], the DU
prefers to retain IPR, otherwise it is indifferent to ownership on that interval.
Corollary 1 implies that the DU’s ownership assignment depends on the firm-specificity
of the innovation. This is because the relative magnitudes of the marginal licensing revenue
and the rate of erosion of the DU’s profit depend on the firm-specificity of the innovation,
τ . However, these magnitudes are also industry specific: they will depend on the structural
parameters of the industry under study. Different factors, such as the number of firms in
the industry, or the nature of the strategic interaction between the firms will impact on the
DU’s decision to retain the IPR. Hence, the next section employs a specific output market
structure to obtain the sensitivity of the DU’s decision to various market parameters.
6 Innovation in a Differentiated Product Market
In this section, a specific market structure is used to explore the IPR ownership issue when
the innovation is for cost reduction or quality improving. The exogenous quantity competi-
tion model of Vives (1985) provides a useful framework for analysing the optimal ownership
arrangement, as it allows for an examination of goods that are gross substitute or comple-
ments. Suppose there are n firms, and there is no entry. Each firm produces a quantity of
a single product, denoted xk, k = 1 . . . , n. Take firm i to be the DU. For the demand side,
suppose that a representative consumer has quasi-linear utility:
u(y, x1, . . . , xn) = y +
n∑
j=1
ajxj − 12
(
n∑
j=1
x2j + 2γ
n∑
j 6=i
xixj
)
where y is the numeraire good, and γ is the degree of substitutability of all the goods, with
−1 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The goods are strategic complements if γ < 0, are independent if γ = 0, and
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are strategic substitutes if γ > 0. With this utility representation, the demand facing each
firm is linear in quantities:
pk = ak − xk − γ
n−1∑
j 6=k
xj, k = 1, . . . , n
where the prices pk, k = 1, . . . , n are taken by the consumer to be fixed. The DU competes
in the product market by selecting a quantity xi ≥ 0 to maximise its profits, conditional on
the anticipated list of quantities selected by each of its rivals.
Then firm k’s best-response to the other firm’s quantities X−k is given by:
x∗k(X−k) ∈ arg max
xk≥0
(
ak − xk − γ
n−1∑
j 6=k
xj − ck
)
xk, k = 1, . . . , n (6.1)
where ak− ck is assumed large enough so that every firm chooses a non-negative quantity of
the good. The Nash equilibrium quantity for each firm in the output market at an interior
solution is given by:
x∗k =
(2 + (n− 1)γ)(ak − ck)− γ
∑
k(ak − ck)
(2− γ)(2 + (n− 1)γ) , ∀k (6.2)
Innovations can be either cost-reducing, or quality improving. In either case, it is assumed
that innovations are non-drastic. They do not drive other firms from the market. In this
linear demand system, cost reducing innovations have the same effect as quality-improving
innovations. For a cost-reducing innovation, θ is the reduction in the DU’s constant marginal
cost c, so that its augmented cost per unit produced is: c − θ. In a symmetric framework,
each of the DU’s rivals could have access to the innovation, although only τ may be installed.
Restricting ak = aj ∀ k, j, the profit for firm k is given by:
pik = (a− xk − γ
n−1∑
j 6=k
xj − (c− τθ))xk = (a+ τθ − xk − γ
n−1∑
j 6=k
xj − c)xk
A quality-improving innovation shifts out the demand curve for the innovating firm. To
simplify the analysis, the marginal cost is assumed to be constant. That is, suppose ck = c
for all k. An innovation of size θ results in a shift out in the demand by τθ, so that ak = a+τθ,
with τ = 1 for k = i. Making these restrictions in (6.2) yields the same expression for profit
as above. Hence, cost-reducing innovations will result in the same optimal output choice
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as quality-improving innovations in this model. Hence, the optimal output choices for each
firm are given by:
x∗i =
(2−γ)(a−c)+(2−γ+(n−1)(1−τ)γ)θ
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ) , x
∗
k =
(2−γ)(a−c)+(2τ−γ)θ
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ) , ∀k 6= i (6.3)
A first order approximation about a zero innovation for the profit of the DU and the license
revenue, assuming a fixed fee license are:
∆pi(θ, τ, γ) :=
(
2(a−c)(2−γ+(n−1)(1−τ)γ)
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ)2
)
, and κ(θ, τ, γ) :=
(
4(n−1)(a−c)τ
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ)2
)
(6.4)
Given this specification, the optimal incentive coefficient and fixed insurance payments are:
α(λ) =
(
2(a−c)(2−γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ))
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ)2(1+rσ2)
)
− λ
(
4(n−1)(a−c)τ
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ)2
)
β = w¯ + (rσ
2−1)
2
(
2(a−c)(2−γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ))
(2−γ)(2+(n−1)γ)2
)
2
These expressions can be used to establish necessary conditions on the pairs of values that
the innovation specificity and substitutability parameters can take. This is done in Lemma
(4):
Lemma 4 The following restrictions are required on the substitution parameter γ and the
degree of innovation specificity τ for an innovation incentive contract to exist:
(A) τ <min
{
n−2
n−1 ,
1+rσ2
1+2rσ2
}
≡ τˆ , (B) γ ∈ I, where I :=
{
γ|γ ∈ [0, 1] or − γ ≤ 2
(n−1)(1−τ)−1
}
.
This product differentiation specification can be used to explore the impact of innovation
specificity, product substitutability, and the number of firms competing in the same output
market as the DU on the IPR ownership decision. In addition, the bearing of the degree of
risk aversion and the variance of the innovation technology on incentives can be determined
more precisely than in the general case.
It was established after Proposition (1) that α(0) > α(1), and for an incentive contract
to be feasible, α(1) > 0. That is, the incentive contract must have some “power”, otherwise
the wage payment is simply a fixed fee. Cases where α(λ) < 0 would mean that the RU must
make transfers back to the DU - effectively paying the DU for provision of its own effort. It
is not untenable that this could happen. After all, the RU needs the DU in order to create
the innovation in the first place that gives rise to the to the external demand. However,
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negative marginal incentive coefficients will be ruled out on the grounds that the RU is cash
constrained and is unable to obtain external financing (see Aghion and Tirole (1994) for the
case where a cash-constrained RU may obtain external finance).
Proposition (5) below establishes that feasibility of RU IPR incentive contracts are bound
above by a critical level of innovation specificity. The reason is not because of an agency leak-
age problem as in Lai et al (2009), but rather that the implicit licensing market subsidisation
of the explicit incentive provided by the DU to the RU would require a negative marginal
incentive coefficient. For innovation specificity above the critical threshold, DU IPR is al-
ways chosen in the production differentiation model. This is because the marginal incentive
coefficient α(0) is always strictly positive, whenever the conditions set out in Lemma (4)
hold.
Proposition 5 There exists a τ ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all τ ∈ [0, τ ∗), RU IPR incentive
contracting is feasible, otherwise the DU prefers to retain ownership of the IPR.
An implication of Proposition (5) is that delegation of IPR would only be observed when the
innovation contracted for has little external value. It is more likely that the DU is indifferent
to IPR ownership when the consequences for erosion of its profit by licensing is small. Again,
other papers have arrived at a similar conclusion, but that is because their analysis trades
off an erosion in profit against the efficiency effect of hiring a specialist. Here, the upper
bound on innovation specificity arises due to a cash-constrained RU.
Given that there is an innovation specificity upper bound on the feasibility of RU IPR
incentive contracting, it is possible to analyse some comparative static effects on the upper
bound. In particular, it is possible to examine how the degree of product differentiation,
γ, and the number of firms in the DU’s output market influence the critical innovation
specificity, τ ∗.
Intuitively, an increase in γ increases the substitutability of the competing firm’s outputs
in the eyes of consumers. This lowers the market power that each firm has for its particular
good, hence lowering the external demand effect. Thus, the proportion of licensing revenues
in total producer surplus becomes smaller, and so the implicit incentive effect from licensing
is smaller, permitting a greater critical pass through of the innovation to the competing firms
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before a full crowding out of explicit DU incentives occurs.
On the other hand, an increase in the number of firms competing in the output market
raises the external demand effect. Therefore, the proportion of licensing revenues in total
surplus becomes larger, and the implicit effect becomes larger. The result is the opposite
from an increase in product substitutability: the marginal incentive coefficient with RU IPR
becomes smaller more rapidly as more firms demand the innovation license, so the critical
pass through of the innovation is smaller when full crowding out of explicit DU incentives
occurs. Proposition (6) formalises these comparative static effects:
Proposition 6 In the product differentiation model, an increase in n, a decrease in γ and
an increase in r or σ2 lower the critical innovation specificity, τ ∗:
dτ ∗
dn
< 0,
dτ ∗
dγ
> 0,
dτ ∗
drσ2
> 0
The positive relationship between the critical innovation specificity and the size r and σ2
arises because the more risk averse the RU is, or the more risky their task is, the lower effort
they exert. So on average, the innovation is smaller. Hence, more of the innovation can
be passed through to the DU’s competitors before the erosion of the DU’s profit becomes
dominant.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the conditions under which a DU would prefer
to retain control over the IPR and residual control rights to licensing when contracting for an
innovation. The results showed that whenever it would be in the interest of the DU to license
an innovation to its competitors, the DU is actually indifferent to delegating IPR ownership
to the RU or keeping it. The reason was that the RU still exerts the same amount of effort
under both ownership arrangements because its total incentives remain the same: the total
marginal incentive under DU IPR is equal to the sum of the lower explicit incentive and the
new implicit incentive from the external source of demand under RU IPR. In addition, the
conditions for which the DU would choose to retain the IPR were derived: whenever the rate
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of erosion of the DU’s profit from the leakage of the innovation knowledge to its competitors
was greater than the marginal licensing revenue.
In the context of a product differentiation model, it was established that feasible incentive
contracting gives rise to a new ownership result: provided that the innovation specificity, τ ∗
is below a given critical threshold, RU IPR is feasible, otherwise the DU prefers to retain
IPR ownership. The critical threshold τ ∗ was shown to be sensitive to the degree of product
substitutability, the number of firms that the DU competes with, and the risk aversion
parameters of the RU.
The results of this model were generated by imposing some strict linearity conditions
to get a closed form solution for the incentive coefficients in the linear compensation wage.
The next step is to determine whether the equivalence of IPR ownership result holds more
generally. If the result is more general, then the interesting question becomes how the
equivalence of IPR ownership can be broken. This line of research is currently under study.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma (1)
Expanding the expression for the certainty equivalence of RU, u(wCE) = E ε˜u(w(θ)−C(e)+
λl(θ, τ)), yields:
−e−rwCE = −
∫ +∞
−∞
e−r(β+αe+αε−
1
2
e2+λκ(τ)e+λκ(τ)ε) 1√
2piσ2
e
−(θ−e)2
2σ2 dε
= −e−r(β+αe+λκe−12 e2)
∫ +∞
−∞
e−r(α+λκ(τ))ε 1√
2piσ2
e
−(θ−e)2
2σ2 dε
= −e−r(β+(α+λκ(τ))e−12 e2)e−r( r2 (α+λκ(τ))2σ2)
⇐⇒ wCE = β + (α + λκ(τ))e− 12e2 − r2(α + λκ(τ))2σ2
where the third equality follows using the moment generating function:∫ +∞
−∞
e−r(α+λκ(τ))ε 1√
2piσ2
e
−(θ−e)2
2σ2 dε = e−
1
2
r2(α+λκ(τ))2σ2
Rewriting the last line yields the result. 
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8.2 Proof of Proposition (1)
Taking the derivative with respect to α of the maximand of the DU’s program and using
(3.8) yields:
∆pi(τ) + (1− λ)κ(τ) + (α + λκ(τ))(1− rσ2)− (2α + λκ(τ)) = 0 (8.1)
Solving this equation for α yields the result. The second order condition is satisfied: −(1 +
rσ2) < 0. 
8.3 Proof of Proposition (2)
The result follows directly from computing the equilibrium effort level from the RU’s incentive
compatibility constraint (2):
e(λ) =
(
∆pi(τ) + (1− λ)κ(τ)− λκ(τ)rσ2 + λκ(τ)(1 + rσ2)
1 + rσ2
)
=
∆pi(τ) + κ(τ)
1 + rσ2
= e∗
since the second equality shows no λ dependence. 
8.4 Proof of Lemma (3)
Starting with: w(θ) = β+α(λ)e(λ), where α(λ) is from Proposition (1) and e(λ) is the right
hand side of the IC condition of Lemma (2). Writing in full,
w(θ) = β +
(
∆pi(τ) + (1− λ)κ(τ)− λκ(τ)rσ2
1 + rσ2
)(
∆pi(τ) + κ(τ)
1 + rσ2
)
(8.2)
where it can be seen that β is independent of λ. Hence, the difference in the wage bill is due
only to the difference in the expected marginal incentive bill:
∆w(θ) = w(θ)λ=1 − w(θ)λ=0 = α(1)e1 − α(0)e0 = −κ(τ)(∆pi(τ) + κ(τ))
1 + rσ2
< 0 (8.3)
Hence, the total expected wage bill is smaller under RU IPR ownership. 
8.5 Proof of Proposition (3)
The proof simply shows that if the DU would choose to license the innovation, then the
reduction in its expected wage bill that would occur if it signed over the IPR to the RU is
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exactly offset by the loss of licensing revenue that it would incur. Define the change in the
ex ante expected value to the DU as:
∆V (θ, τ) = Eε˜
[
∆pi(τ)(α(1) + κ(τ))− (∆pi(τ)α(0) + κ(τ)α(0))−∆w(θ˜)
]
From Lemma (2), the optimal amount of effort exerted is the same under either mode of
ownership, hence the expected magnitudes of the gross profit effects are identical. Accounting
for this and substituting for the linear approximation of the license revenue yields:
∆V (θ, τ) = Eε˜
[
−κ(τ)α(0)−∆w(θ˜)
]
The result follows from Lemma (3) and the solution for the optimal incentive coefficient α(1)
from Proposition (1). 
8.6 Proof of Lemma (4)
For an incentive contract to exist, a necessary condition is for ∆pi(τ) ≥ 0. Since a > c
and |γ| ≤ 1 by assumption, examination of the direct profit expressions show that it is
always positive. In comparison, a quality-improving innovation requires condition (B). For
condition (B) to hold, its denominator must be positive. This gives the first component of
the minimum argument in condition (A) τ < n−2
n−1 . For an incentive contract to have power,
it requires α > 0. Moreover, discussion of the comparative statics for the optimal incentive
coefficient of equation (1) indicate that α(1) < α(0). So, for α(1) ≥ 0, then in general terms
∆pi(τ)
κ(τ)
≥ rσ2. In the parameters of the product differentiation model, τ ≤ 1+rσ2
1+2rσ2
, which
accounts for the second component of condition (A). 
8.7 Proof of Proposition (5)
Whenever α(1) < 0, even though Epi(1) = Epi(0), incentive contracting with IR IPR requires
the RU to compensate the DU for its own effort, therefore RU IPR incentive contracts are
not feasible. On the other hand α(0) > 0, ∀τ , which implies that DU IPR would be feasible.
The proof of existence of a critical innovation specificity τ ∗ involves finding the value of τ ∗
where α(1, τ ∗) = 0. It is straightforward to see that α(1) ≥ 0 ⇔ 1
1+rσ2
≥ κ(τ)
∆pi(τ)+κ(τ)
. Define
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f(τ) := κ(τ)
∆pi(τ)+κ(τ)
= 2(n−1)τ
(2+γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ)) . Then τ
∗ is implicitly defined by f(τ ∗) ≥ 1
1+rσ2
.
Note that:
f ′(τ ∗) = 2(n−1)(2+nγ)
(2+γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ))2 > 0, ∀n, γ ∈ I
Hence f(τ) is strictly increasing and continuous on [0, 1]. Also, f(0) = 0 and f(1) =
2(n−1)
(2+γ+2(n−1)) < 1. There are two cases: (I) If f(1) >
1
1+rσ2
then RU IPR incentive con-
tract is feasible for all τ . (II) If f(1) < 1
1+rσ2
, then by the IVT, there exists a unique
τ ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that f(τ ∗) = 1
1+rσ2
. Then for τ ∈ [0, τ ∗) : f(τ) < 1
1+rσ2
which implies that
RU IPR incentive contracting is feasible. For τ ∈ [τ ∗, 1] : f(τ) ≥ 1
1+rσ2
which implies that
RU IPR incentive contracting is not feasible. 
8.8 Proof of Proposition (6)
The equation f(γ, n, τ ∗(γ, n)) = κ(τ
∗)
∆pi(τ∗)+κ(τ∗) =
1
1+rσ2
implicitly defines τ ∗. Totally differen-
tiating this equation with respect to i = γ, n yields:
∂f
∂i
+ ∂f
∂τ
dτ∗
di
= 0, i = γ, n, rσ2
Solving for the comparative static yields: dτ
∗
di
= − ∂f/∂i
∂f/∂τ
for i = γ, n, rσ2. Then the signs of
the comparative statics are:
dτ∗
dγ
= −sign
(
∂f
∂γ
)
, & dτ
∗
dn
= −sign (∂f
∂n
)
, & dτ
∗
drσ2
= −sign ( ∂f
∂rσ2
)
Using the definition of f(τ) from above, the signs of the derivatives of this function with
respect to each of the variables are:
∂f
∂γ
= − 2(n−1)τ(1+(n−1)(1−τ))
(2+γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ))2 < 0, &
∂f
∂n
= 2τ(2+γ)
(2+γ+(n−1)(γ+(2−γ)τ))2 > 0, &
∂f
∂rσ2
= − 1
(1+rσ2)2
< 0
Using the signs of these derivatives gives the result. 
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